Document Sentry self-hosted deployment

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-08 15:31:21 +03:30
parent 3f94ced9ea
commit ea638c0eae
11 changed files with 491 additions and 128 deletions
+9 -2
View File
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ Publicly exposed services:
* Jitsi Web
* BaGet
* Nextcloud
* Sentry
High-sensitivity exposure:
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ High-sensitivity exposure:
* Xray exposes tunneling capability and must be monitored for abuse, unexpected traffic and unauthorized use.
* Portainer exposes Docker management and must be restricted to trusted administrators.
* Nextcloud exposes private file storage and must require strong user authentication, HTTPS and prompt security updates.
* Sentry exposes application error data and must require strong authentication, HTTPS and careful project/token management.
Nginx Proxy Manager findings from the 2026-06-24 proxy-host snapshot:
@@ -168,13 +170,15 @@ Nginx Proxy Manager findings from the 2026-06-24 proxy-host snapshot:
* `cicd.silveressence.net` is intentionally enabled as a frequently changing prototype deployment endpoint.
* `exactsyncer.silveressence.net` is intentionally enabled as a client-facing Exact Online syncer demo endpoint.
* `cloud.silveressence.net` is enabled for Nextcloud with WebSocket and Block Exploits enabled, but SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS disabled and no access list.
* `sentry.silveressence.net` is enabled for Sentry with SSL Force, HTTP/2, WebSocket and Block Exploits enabled; HSTS is disabled and no access list is assigned.
Priority hardening:
1. Enable SSL Force for all HTTPS public service routes unless there is a documented exception.
2. Enable SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS for Nextcloud unless there is a documented exception.
3. Add an access list or equivalent restriction for DbGate and Portainer.
4. Define explicit exposure and authentication expectations for prototype and demo endpoints.
3. Enable HSTS for Sentry unless there is a documented exception.
4. Add an access list or equivalent restriction for DbGate and Portainer.
5. Define explicit exposure and authentication expectations for prototype and demo endpoints.
---
@@ -310,6 +314,7 @@ Network model:
* Isolated stack networks are used for Jitsi, Xray and CI/CD runner separation.
* `xray_default` currently exists without a running container attached; the active `xray` container is attached to `proxy`.
* `nextcloud_nextcloud_internal` isolates Nextcloud database and Redis traffic from the public proxy layer.
* `sentry-self-hosted_default` isolates Sentry databases, queues, workers and event processing services from shared application networks.
---
@@ -359,6 +364,8 @@ Periodically verify:
* Nextcloud security advisories are reviewed and the image is updated promptly
* Nextcloud database and Redis ports remain internal-only
* Nextcloud proxy route uses HTTPS with SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS enabled unless there is a documented exception
* Sentry upstream self-hosted release notes are reviewed before updates
* Sentry internal services remain inaccessible except through the public Sentry web or nginx entry layer
* Public services are still routed only through Nginx Proxy Manager
* Removed proxy hosts and unused certificates stay removed unless explicitly approved
* Prototype and demo proxy hosts have documented owners and exposure expectations