Document Sentry self-hosted deployment
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@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ Publicly exposed services:
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* Jitsi Web
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* BaGet
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* Nextcloud
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* Sentry
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High-sensitivity exposure:
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@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ High-sensitivity exposure:
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* Xray exposes tunneling capability and must be monitored for abuse, unexpected traffic and unauthorized use.
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* Portainer exposes Docker management and must be restricted to trusted administrators.
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* Nextcloud exposes private file storage and must require strong user authentication, HTTPS and prompt security updates.
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* Sentry exposes application error data and must require strong authentication, HTTPS and careful project/token management.
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Nginx Proxy Manager findings from the 2026-06-24 proxy-host snapshot:
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@@ -168,13 +170,15 @@ Nginx Proxy Manager findings from the 2026-06-24 proxy-host snapshot:
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* `cicd.silveressence.net` is intentionally enabled as a frequently changing prototype deployment endpoint.
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* `exactsyncer.silveressence.net` is intentionally enabled as a client-facing Exact Online syncer demo endpoint.
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* `cloud.silveressence.net` is enabled for Nextcloud with WebSocket and Block Exploits enabled, but SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS disabled and no access list.
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* `sentry.silveressence.net` is enabled for Sentry with SSL Force, HTTP/2, WebSocket and Block Exploits enabled; HSTS is disabled and no access list is assigned.
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Priority hardening:
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1. Enable SSL Force for all HTTPS public service routes unless there is a documented exception.
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2. Enable SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS for Nextcloud unless there is a documented exception.
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3. Add an access list or equivalent restriction for DbGate and Portainer.
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4. Define explicit exposure and authentication expectations for prototype and demo endpoints.
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3. Enable HSTS for Sentry unless there is a documented exception.
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4. Add an access list or equivalent restriction for DbGate and Portainer.
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5. Define explicit exposure and authentication expectations for prototype and demo endpoints.
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---
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@@ -310,6 +314,7 @@ Network model:
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* Isolated stack networks are used for Jitsi, Xray and CI/CD runner separation.
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* `xray_default` currently exists without a running container attached; the active `xray` container is attached to `proxy`.
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* `nextcloud_nextcloud_internal` isolates Nextcloud database and Redis traffic from the public proxy layer.
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* `sentry-self-hosted_default` isolates Sentry databases, queues, workers and event processing services from shared application networks.
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---
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@@ -359,6 +364,8 @@ Periodically verify:
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* Nextcloud security advisories are reviewed and the image is updated promptly
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* Nextcloud database and Redis ports remain internal-only
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* Nextcloud proxy route uses HTTPS with SSL Force, HTTP/2 and HSTS enabled unless there is a documented exception
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* Sentry upstream self-hosted release notes are reviewed before updates
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* Sentry internal services remain inaccessible except through the public Sentry web or nginx entry layer
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* Public services are still routed only through Nginx Proxy Manager
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* Removed proxy hosts and unused certificates stay removed unless explicitly approved
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* Prototype and demo proxy hosts have documented owners and exposure expectations
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